Rediscovering Hermann Cohen
Who would you name as the most important Jewish philosopher of the 19th century? People still talk about Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808–1888) the founder of Neo-Orthodoxy, Abraham Geiger (1810–1874) the leading proponent of Reform Judaism, Leopold Zunz (1794–1886) who founded the so-called ‘Science of Judaism’ (Wissenschaft des Judentums) making Jewish studies a modern academic disciple. Some might add Karl Marx to the list. But Hermann Cohen (1842–1918)? Who now talks about him? Or has even heard of him?
I have been talking about Jewish teachers and Jewish thought for a long time now but I don’t think I have ever even mentioned Hermann Cohen and the significance of his thinking. He died in 1918 so his work overlaps somewhat with both Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig – of course their influence on Jewish thinking has been enormous and they have come to overshadow Cohen, who was nevertheless an inescapable influence on both of them.
I’d like to approach Cohen through the lens of one verse in our weekly Torah portion. It is such a familiar text that you might have become rather blasé about what a radical concept it articulates.
“You shall not do wrong to a stranger, you shall not oppress them, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Exodus 22:20) – 36 times the Torah speaks about this core ethical command. As you can imagine, strangers – outsiders to a society – suffered discrimination then as they do now. The stranger is always at risk from the ignorance, the prejudice, the fear of any majority community to which they don’t innately belong.
But underpinning Jewish consciousness is the historical memory of being outsiders, in Egypt; and the Biblical writers’ awareness of this was so omnipresent that they made it the cornerstone of interpersonal Jewish ethical living: an enhanced concern for those we don’t naturally think of as ‘us’. The Torah mandated that those living amongst us who were not inherently one of ‘us’ were to be embraced, protected, cared about, as if they were one of us. They are, as it were, family. Our human family.
As I said, I think we can get blasé about this : we may not appreciate just how revolutionary – and subversive – an idea that was two and a half millennia ago; let alone in Trump’s America or for certain politicians closer to home in the UK.
Hermann Cohen’s comment on this verse goes like this: “This law of shielding the alien from all wrong is of vital significance in the history of religion. With it alone, true Religion begins. The alien was to be protected, not because he was a member of one’s family, clan, religious community, or people; but because he was a human being. In the alien, therefore, man discovered the idea of humanity.”
For Cohen, the treatment of the other is the foundation stone around which Jewish ethics is built. He understood ‘loving one’s neighbour’ as inclusive not exclusive. He read it as a universalistic demand rooted in our shared humanity with others, not a particularistic demand to look after our own. The Biblical emphasis on protecting the stranger was a call to a morality of care over and above those whom conventional thinking might prioritise – “one’s family, clan, religious community, or people”, as he put it. Charity might ‘begin at home’, in conventional thinking – but Judaism’s core demand was to transcend conventional thinking, self-absorbed thinking, emotionally complacent thinking, tribal thinking, and embrace a much more demanding and maybe uncomfortable ethical position. The inherited memory of our history of outsiderdom becomes the catalyst for moral action in the present.
So Cohen’s reading of the Torah, his understanding of the Jewish task in the world, sees Jews as having a distinctive ethical contribution to make: to be a particular people whose concern goes beyond our own group. He saw this as a model of how to bring the messianic age – universal concern for all, beyond nationalism, transforms the divisions and conflicts of what is into the harmony and fraternity of what could be.
There is a terrible, and tragic, irony in all this: Cohen experienced himself to be, and saw Jews in Germany to be, an integral part of German society, indeed European society. They were now emancipated, it was the modern condition – Jews were now newly permitted to enter fully into the mainstream of national life. He’d studied at Dresden, Berlin and Halle universities, by 1875 he was professor in philosophy at Marburg, he was completely integrated into the life of his homeland while recognising that, historically, Jews had been vulnerable wherever they lived, they had suffered over the generations – and suffered with dignity – while remaining true to their faith; and although of course he was aware that they still suffered from prejudice, he believed that the only way Jews could overcome this history was by emphasising and enacting their moral mission. Their mission was pedagogic – to teach the universal ethic of sustained humanitarianism. That was the Jewish purpose in whatever land they lived – and Jews needed to live in many lands to fulfil this purpose (that’s why he opposed Zionism). He was committed to Diasporism as the route to societal transformation, as the route to the messianic age foretold in the Biblical texts.
He was the archetypal representative of what became known as the German-Jewish symbiosis, the idea originating with Moses Mendelsohn in the 18th century, who had argued for a synthesis of Jewish tradition and German Enlightenment ideals. Jews could be fully acculturated in their homelands in Europe, said Mendelsohn, and still stay true to Jewish practices, beliefs and values. And for over a century this is what happened: Jews integrated into German and Central European life and became adept in law, medicine, business as well as providing new creative energy within literary, scientific and artistic life across the continent.
So Hermann Cohen’s commitment to social justice was part of a wider and deeper shift in Jewish self-understanding about how to be both Jewish and European. This was the first time in history this had been possible. And although assimilation and conversion were also aspects of the Jewish response to modernity, Cohen represented the ways in which one could be fully participating in one’s national culture while maintaining and enacting one’s Jewish religious beliefs and practices.
But the tragic irony of this, of course, was the way in which within twenty years of Cohen’s death Germany had turned against its fellow Jews – with all the horrors that was to involve. Some might argue – this became part of the currency of Zionist thinking, particularly after the Shoah – that what happened in Nazi times negated the whole rationale of Jewish purpose that someone like Hermann Cohen represented. Perhaps that’s why he fell out of fashion. In the 1960s Gershon Scholem, for example, called the German-Jewish symbiosis a ‘one-sided love affair’ – that Jews were naïve in believing they were fully accepted and their contributions welcomed. Well, there is some evidence for Scholem’s scepticism – but there’s nothing like being wise after the event.
But I would like to rehabilitate, as it were, Hermann Cohen’s philosophical Jewish idealism – to rescue it from the condescension of history. Because if social justice is not the centrepiece of ethical Judaism in the Diaspora, or in Israel – if it is relegated to a sideshow or a luxury – then it is hard to know what justifies the dogged determination of the Jewish people to keep on going as a distinctive people. Without adherence to the core justification for Jewishness – to bring the divine into the world through acts of compassion, love and justice – we might as well just assimilate and have done with the whole crazy project.
For me the significance of Cohen has taken on a new urgency in the light of the last few years in our long and complex history. Cohen believed that Jews were destined to fulfil their ethical obligations – their mission, so to speak – as participants in the countries in which they lived. He disagreed with his contemporary Martin Buber in this. Buber felt that the dispersion of the Jews meant they were prevented from collective self-realization. That led Buber to support Zionism, although he maintained a consistent ethical stance about its obligations in relation to those already living in the land, that statehood should not be built on the suffering of the Arab Palestinians. So while Cohen did not support the Zionist project, what they agreed on was that the Jewish mission in the world had a universalistic aim, a messianic aim of societal transformation. They just disagreed about whether Jews needed a separate state to fulfil this.
In some ways I would suggest that Buber’s vision is now buried under the rubble of Gaza and is being desecrated daily on the hilltops and valleys of the West Bank. Which leaves us Diaspora Jews with the dilemma: Cohen or Buber? Do we stay true to Cohen’s messianic hopefulness that here where we live is the Zion in which Torah is enacted and our moral responsibilities as Jews find their expression? Or do we stay true to Buber’s messianic hopefulness that despite the failures and flaws of Jewish nationalism, the pain it has caused, the opprobrium it has garnered that has spilled out onto Jews around the world, do we stay true to the hope that the Jewish mission of bringing compassion and justice to a fractured world can be salvaged from the ruins? That a national home can recover, restore, its Jewish values for the good not just of fellow Jews but for the strangers, the outsiders, with which we share a common humanity?
[my thoughts on Hermann Cohen are a development of themes laid out in Adam Sutcliffe’s brilliant text ‘What Are Jews For? History, Peoplehood and Purpose’ (Princeton University Press, 2020]
[based on a sermon at Finchley Reform Synagogue, London, February 14th, 2026]